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ABSTRACT 
 
Theories of substance have dominated much of the literature in metaphysics. 
Today, there are two prominent accounts of substance: bare particularism and bundle 
theory. Both theories are attractive for different reasons, yet both have serious problems. 
While bare particularism and bundle theory enjoy preference in the literature on 
substance, I think that hylemorphism and the metaphysics of substance formulated by 
Aristotle and adopted by Saint Thomas Aquinas is an attractive view for two reasons: (1) 
its ability to account for both substantial and accidental change, and (2) its ability to 
account for the teleological nature of substance. To account for substantial change, 
hylemorphism makes a distinction between different types of form and matter. In 
substantial change, the substantial form of a substance is destroyed and replaced with a 
new substantial form. The subject of this change is prime matter. In accidental change, 
an accidental form is replaced by a new accidental form and the subject of this change is 
secondary matter, or the substance itself. Furthermore, a substance can also be 
understood as a composite of essence and accidents. By postulating an essence distinct 
from its accidents, hylemorphism can explain how substances are internally unified and 
directed towards a range of characteristic ends. As an integral part of a more general 
metaphysics, hylemorphism provides motivation to revisit the metaphysics of Aristotle 
and Aquinas.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Theories of substance have enjoyed much attention throughout the history of 
philosophy. The notion of substance has its roots in Plato and Aristotle, but even today 
novel accounts of substance can be found. The concept of substance has so many 
historical connotations that many contemporary thinkers opt to use “object” or “thing” 
when discussing an ontologically independent entity. This leads to confusion when 
interacting with ancient and medieval texts. Aristotle and Aquinas (A-T hereafter) have a 
specific notion of substance that does not neatly map onto contemporary terminology. 
Therefore, I think it best to adopt the traditional terminology when discussing historical 
accounts of substance. 
 In this thesis I will defend the traditional hylemorphism of A-T against 
contemporary accounts of substance. While there are many games in town, so to speak, 
bare particularism and bundle theory are the most prominent contemporary accounts of 
substance. Furthermore, each of these views has a variety of defenders who often 
disagree with one another. For this reason, I will primarily focus on the work of two 
philosophers for each theory. Concerning bare particularism, I will use J. P. Moreland 
and Timothy Pickavance with help from the catechismal work of Nathan Wildman. For 
bundle theory, I will focus on Peter Simons’ nuclear bundle theory (NT) and Markku 
Keinanen’s strong nuclear theory (SNT).  
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 After explicating the major themes of these two contemporary theories, I will 
then explain the theory of hylemorphism. This theory originates in Aristotle, but I will 
use its medieval defender, St. Thomas Aquinas, to lay out its central features. While this 
theory is over 2,000 years old, it still has ardent defenders in contemporary metaphysics. 
I will briefly look at the works of David Oderberg, Edward Feser, and Anna Marmodoro 
to show the viability and traction of this theory today. 
 Finally, I will show why hylemorphism is the most attractive theory of substance. 
To do this, I will argue that substantial change and the teleological nature of substance 
are critical explananda in the realm of metaphysics, and, that traditional hylemorphism 
gives us the best explanation for these phenomena. Furthermore, as hylemorphism is but 
one part of A-T metaphysics, motivation for this theory of substance also provides a 
good reason to take the metaphysics of A-T more seriously.  
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CHAPTER II 
CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS OF SUBSTANCE 
 
 
 Theories of substance have a rich history, easily dating back to ancient Greece. 
Today, there are remnants of traditional accounts of substance along with many new 
views. In this thesis, I defend traditional hylemorphism, which is the substance theory of 
Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. While this view is perhaps the oldest and among the 
most robust (in terms of breadth of the overall worldview), hylemorphism is very much a 
peripheral account of substance in today’s literature. In this section, I will look at two of 
the major theories of substance: bare particularism and bundle theory. Both of these 
views attempt to trace their heritage back to ancient Greece, but virtually all of the work 
being done is explicitly novel, rather than exegetical. I will focus on the work of J. P. 
Moreland and Timothy Pickavance to lay out bare particularism. For bundle theory, I 
will primarily use Peter Simons and Markku Keinanen.  
 
BARE PARTICULARISM 
 
 
 Bare particularism, like most theories, has a general structure with several 
branches building off the main thesis. Some theories utilize traditional terms like 
“substratum” while others designate novel expressions like “thick” and “thin” 
particulars. Some theories are nominalist, but most opt for realism. In discussing bare 
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particularism, I will focus on the recent writings of J. P. Moreland and Timothy 
Pickavance to highlight two important “roles” of the bare particular, individuation and 
exemplification. With the help of recent work by Nathan Wildman, I will begin this 
section with some introductory remarks on bare particulars. 
 In an explicitly “catechismal” paper,1 Nathan Wildman surveys the bare 
particularist position. He begins with the usual story: constituent substance ontologies 
require an internal, ontological structure within any substance. “When it comes to such 
ontologies”, Wildman says, “there are two major games in town”: bundle theory and 
bare particularism.2 He notes that bare particularists are often motivated to reject bundle 
theory with a reference to Max Black’s famous scenario.3 Bare particularism avoids the 
quandary by postulating that the two spheres have different bare particulars, and are 
therefore numerically distinct. Wildman notes that another major motivation for bare 
particularism over bundle theory is the problems with substance unity: 
Bundle theory says that Tomato just is the bundle of redness, roundness, and 
tomatohood. But what ties these properties together in any meaningful way—
what bundles the properties, rather than leaving them a loose collection or a set? 
The underlying thought here is that there ought to be something that explains or 
grounds why these properties come together in this substance.4 
 
                                                 
1 Nathan Wildman, “Load Bare-ing Particulars,” Philosophical Studies 172, no. 6 (2015): 1419-
34. 
 
2 Ibid., 1419-20.   
 
3 Max Black, “The Identity of Indiscernibles”, Mind, no. 242 (1952): 153-64. 
  
4 Wildman, “Load Bare-Ing Particulars,” 1420. 
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Having briefly established some motivation for bare particularism, Wildman then lays 
out some particular commitments of this theory. 
 First, bare particularism is committed to “constitution: every substance has (at 
least) two kinds of proper constituents, its properties and its bare particular”.5 Wildman 
thinks that this commitment is universally had by bare particularists, but that beyond 
“constitution”, there is a divergence in views among bare particularists. This divergence 
begins with answering the question of “identity: Is a substance identical to its bare 
particular?”.6 Wildman states that a positive answer entails “One-thingism” and the 
negative, “Two-thingism”. The names of these two camps is creatively revealing—the 
“one-thingist” thinks that substance and the bare particular are one and the same; the 
“two-thingist” thinks the substance and the bare particular are, surprisingly, two things, 
albeit intimately related. Wildman then shows that if we are to be bare particularists, we 
should adopt “two-thingism” as the other alternative either violates “constitution” or 
threatens to collapse into bundle theory.7 
 “Two-thingism” raises an important question with regards to properties: what has 
the properties, the bare particular or the substance? If we answer that the bare particular 
does not have properties, we run into the classic objection against bare particularism: 
everything must have some properties. Noting this, Wildman says the bare particularist 
ought to say that both the substance and the bare particular have properties: “without the 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 1420. 
  
6 Ibid., 1422.  
 
7 Ibid., 1422. 
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pin-cushion that is Tom [the bare particular of the substance Tomato], there’d be nothing 
for Tomato’s property-pins to stick together in”.8 However, this raises an arguably more 
important question: does the substance have properties the same way a bare particular 
does? 
 Wildman notes that the bare particularist can then choose between “one-
relationism” and “two-relationism”. For the one-relationist, “there is one and only one 
instantiation relation, such that the having linking Tom [bare particular] to being a 
tomato is the very same having as the one connecting Tomato [substance] to the 
property”.9 Accordingly, the “two-relationist” posits two such relations, and a further set 
of distinctions is needed. Wildman calls the substance-to-property relation possessing, 
and the bare-particular-to-property relation bearing. With these distinctions made clear, 
Wildman asks two questions: (1) does a bare particular possess properties, and (2) does a 
bare particular bear properties? The “two-relationist” ought to say that bare particulars 
bear properties but they do not possess them—they are, after all, “bare” for a reason! 
Wildman argues: 
This still ensures that even bare particulars like Tom ‘have’ properties (in some 
sense of ‘have’), which not only blocks any potential revival of the Classic 
Objection [everything has properties] but also makes clear that Tomato’s and 
Tom’s havings are markedly different beasts”.10 
 
However, this, once again, requires the bare particularist to clarify his position. 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 1424. 
  
9 Ibid.  
 
10 Ibid., 1425. 
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 Wildman says that this nuanced understanding of “having” moves one to accept 
the following tenet: “Possessing: every substance possesses its properties by having as 
constituents properties that are borne by another of its constituents”.11 This possession 
refers to a substance [Tomato] that “has” its properties by possessing, as a proper 
constituent, Tom [bare particular of substance Tomato], which actually bears the 
properties. This move is motivated by a desire to avoid the classic objection, and by the 
need to carefully unpack “having”.  
 To recap: Wildman argues that if one is to opt for bare particularism, they ought 
to commit to the following conjunction: “constitution”, “two-thingism”, “two-
relationism”, and “possessing”. But even this nuanced view still has some glaring 
concerns.12 Wildman thinks that one who is willing to take the steps outlined above 
might be better off reconsidering another theory of substance. While his paper does 
already show the moves a bare particularist makes, I think that a discussion of J. P. 
Moreland and Timothy Pickavance will lead to a greater appreciation of where bare 
particularism is situated in the contemporary debate on substance. 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
  
12 Ibid., 1432.  
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Bare Particularism and Individuation 
 
In his recent paper, “Bare Particulars and Exemplification”,13 Timothy 
Pickavance begins with a brief discussion of two fundamental questions for the bare 
particularist: first, what do bare particulars do, and second, what must bare particulars be 
like in order to do these things? The answer to question one, simply put according to 
Pickavance, is that bare particulars individuate and exemplify.14 While the answer can be 
simply put, the argument in defense of bare particulars being able to individuate and 
exemplify is rather complicated and likewise contentious—more on this later. To the 
second question, what must bare particulars be like in order to individuate and 
exemplify, Pickavance replies that “they [i.e. bare particulars] must be (i) non-shareable, 
(ii) constituent-less, (iii) property-bearing, (iv) constituents of substances”.15 He argues 
that bare particulars must be (i), (ii), and (iv) in order to individuate and they must be 
(iii) to exemplify. I think that these two questions are very helpful starting point for a 
discussion of the bare particularist theory in general, so I will begin with individuation. 
                                                 
13 Timothy Pickavance, “Bare Particulars and Exemplification,” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 51, no. 2 (2014): 95-108. 
 
14 Ibid., 95. 
 
15 Ibid., 96.  
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In a seminal paper, “Theories of Individuation: A Reconsideration of Bare 
Particulars”,16 J. P. Moreland quotes Gustav Bergmann’s classical definition of bare 
particulars: 
Bare particulars neither are nor have natures. Any two of them are not 
intrinsically but only numerically different. That is their bareness. It is impossible 
for a bare particular to be ‘in’ more than one ordinary thing…A bare particular is 
a mere individuator…It does nothing else.17 
 
Moreland says that this definition implies three propositions concerning bare particulars. 
First, he thinks that a bare particular is not a property or relation, but “a numerically 
primitive individual of logical type zero in Russell’s sense”.18 Second, he emphasizes 
that bare particulars do not have natures or properties at all. And third, that the bare 
particular’s only job is individuation. Moreland thinks that the first proposition is rather 
clear; the second is ambiguous but will be made clear once we come to understanding 
the way bare particulars “have” properties; and the third proposition needs qualification.  
 Moreland thinks the claim that bare particulars are solely individuators needs 
more attention—and he is correct as we shall see that Pickavance seems to question 
this.19 Moreland qualifies his proposition by saying that: 
Bare particulars have been called upon to serve a number of metaphysical roles 
in addition to individuation: the unifier and possessor of all a primary substance’s 
properties (e.g., Locke’s view of substance), the ground for the concreteness of 
                                                 
16 J. P. Moreland, “Theories of Individuation: A Reconsideration of Bare Particulars,” Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly 79, no. (1998): 251-63. 
 
17 Ibid., 253-4.  
 
18 Ibid., 254.  
 
19 Pickavance, “Bare Particulars and Exemplification,” 105.  
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an ordinary thing if properties are taken as abstract entities, that which accounts 
for the endurance of a substance through intrinsic qualitative change. In this 
article, I follow Bergmann and I am only discussing bare particulars as 
individuators. In fact, I do not think that they serve any of those other roles just 
mentioned, except perhaps concretization.20 
 
Moreland is clear that bare particulars should only be called upon to individuate, but the 
question then becomes what else, if not the bare particular, can account for unity, 
concreteness, and endurance through change?  
 In order to defend bare particulars as individuals, Moreland addresses some 
common objections to this tenet. The first string of complaints against bare particularism 
falls loosely under a “coherence” problem: 
(1) It is a necessary truth that any entity exemplifies properties yet bare 
particulars exemplify no properties. 
(2) Bare particulars are supposed to have no properties, certainly no properties 
necessarily, yet there are many properties they have and have necessarily: 
being concrete, being particular, transcendental properties like colored if 
green, being the constituent of at most one entity, having the properties of 
lacking properties. 
(3) Once cannot grasp or apprehend or conceive something that doesn’t 
exemplify properties so bare particulars fail in this respect.21 
 
 
Moreland thinks that some of these coherence objections are suspect, and the rest based 
on a misinterpretation of the bare particularist position. “Lacking a property”, or a 
negative property, cannot be a property; it is simply a brute fact that a substance lacks 
some property. To address the misunderstanding of the position, Moreland speaks of 
                                                 
20 Moreland, “Theories of Individuation,” 254.  
 
21 Ibid., 256.  
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“two different senses of being bare along with two different ways something can have a 
property”.22 
 To illustrate these differences, Moreland compares the bare particular to an 
Aristotelian substance. According to Moreland, the Aristotelian substance Fido, a dog, 
has a property, being brown. Fido, as a substance, is “constituted”23 by an essence that 
contains internal capacities, or potentialities. Fido’s capacities are relative to the nature, 
or substantial form, of Fido, dogness. These potentialities ground the properties that 
Fido, in fact, exemplifies. Moreland continues: “when a substance has a property, that 
property is ‘seated within’ and, thus, an expression of the ‘inner nature’ of the substance 
itself”.24 Therefore, properties are seated, or rooted, within a substance. In contrast, bare 
particulars are “simple and properties are linked or tied to them”.25 For Moreland, the 
different senses of “having” (as discussed in the Wildman paper) are key. Properties are 
rooted in substance, and likewise a substance possesses a property. Properties are linked 
or tied to bare particulars, and likewise bare particulars bear properties. 
 Moreland then addresses D. M. Armstrong’s rejection of bare particularism, 
which is based on states of affairs being unanalyzable and irreducible. For Armstrong, 
the world is full of states of affairs, or “a’s being F”: “a” is a thin particular, “F” is a 
property, and the conjunction “a’s being F” is a thick particular, or state of affairs. 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 257.  
 
23 Ibid.  
 
24 Ibid.  
 
25 Ibid.  
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Armstrong thought that we needed a thin particular to individuate much like a Lockean 
substratum, but the thick particular is not reducible to its constituents. However, 
Moreland thinks that Armstrong’s theory amounts to a bare particularist theory of 
substance. Moreland opts for a careful interpretation of “having” a property and he 
makes a distinction between a substance having a property and a bare particular having a 
property (as Wildman noted above). 
 The last of the incoherence objections that Moreland answers is the 
conceivability of a bare particular as something that does not exemplify properties. 
Moreland first says that we must distinguish between sense apprehension and 
acquaintance from conceptual grasping. He thinks that it is true we cannot sensibly 
apprehend the bare particular, but he can “easily”26 conceive of the bare particular in 
itself, stripped of properties, just as an individuator. Interestingly, Moreland makes a 
bolder claim: “even if we grant that such conceivings are impossible, it only follows that 
we can conceive of bare particulars only by grasping them through their properties”.27 
More on this claim later, but it seems very similar to the way hylemorphists defend the 
existence of prime matter. 
 The final objection that Moreland addresses relates to the fact that bare 
particulars always exist with properties, some necessary. It is clear why bare particulars 
are tied to properties, since they are constituents of substances that possess various 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 259.  
 
27 Ibid.  
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properties—but can a bare particular “splinter off on [its] own”?28 Moreland thinks that 
there is no good answer to this question; he thinks that bare particulars are independent 
entities since they are simples. He also replies that he is committed to a general theory of 
existence that does not allow “existence” to be a property simpliciter.  
 Moreland’s bare particularist individuation is committed to the independent 
existence of bare particulars, which, in his opinion, are easily conceived of stripped of 
properties. Also, he thinks that Aristotle’s ontology may not be so different from 
contemporary bare particularism (prime matter as the substratum). While Moreland’s 
work on this theory is foundational, Timothy Pickavance has written extensively on bare 
particularism as well, and he seems to align himself with J. P. Moreland. 
 
Bare Particularism and Exemplification 
 
 Pickavance’s paper, “Bare Particulars and Exemplification”, divides the duties of 
the bare particular into individuation and exemplification. Moreland wrote on 
individuation; now, Pickavance makes the case for bare particular exemplification. Both 
of these papers have much common ground, but I think that a detailed look at each paper 
is required for a better understanding of the bare particularist position. 
 Following Morelands’s ontology, Pickavance begins with a reiteration of the two 
senses of “having” a property. For Moreland and Pickavance, the bare particular, b(t), of 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 260.  
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substance t exemplifies the property of, for example, being a tomato. However, this 
exemplification is not like a substance having its properties, a constituent-whole 
exemplification, but rather a “strict, philosophical” exemplification.29 Just as Moreland 
used hylemorphism to illustrate the different sense of “having” in his ontology, 
Pickavance too uses Aristotle to show how his two “lessons” are indeed old.30 
 According to Pickavance, bare particulars are like prime matter and essential 
properties are similar to substantial forms. Just as Aristotle distinguished between the 
way prime matter exemplifies substantial form from the way a substance exemplifies 
substantial form, Pickavance thinks any constituent ontology with a substratum requires 
two types of exemplification relations. He says: 
The right way to accommodate this fact is to plump for two types of 
exemplification. The standard way to do this, dating all the way back to Aristotle 
(long before the Incoherence Argument showed up), has it that substrates 
exemplify essences in a non-constitution way, while substances exemplify 
essences by being partially constituted by them. I’ve simply labeled these two 
types of exemplification “SP-exemplification” and CW-exemplification”, 
respectively.31 
Pickavance and Moreland both believe that their two types of exemplification relations 
are rooted in traditional hylemorphism. 
 The next important step in making the case for bare particular exemplification is 
to discuss accidental predication. Pickavance sees two alternatives for the bare 
particularist. First, the substance CW-exemplifies (constituent-whole) the accidental 
                                                 
29 Pickavance, “Bare Particulars and Exemplification,” 97. 
 
30 Ibid., 98.  
 
31 Ibid.  
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property and the bare particular of the substance SP-exemplifies (strict, philosophical) 
the accidental property. Or, second, and resembling Aristotle, the substance SP-
exemplifies the accidental property and together the substance and accidental property 
form a “coincidental”, which, in turn, itself (i.e. the coincidental) CW-exemplifies their 
constituting substance’s accidental properties.32 Pickavance draws out two important 
questions for these two theories of accidental predication. 
 On the first view of accidental predication, the “boundary” of the substance 
includes the bare particular and both the accidental and essential properties. However, 
when we think of change this raises an interesting question: how do we differentiate 
between essential and accidental properties? On the one hand, it seems that the substance 
needs its constituents to be identified across time, but we also acknowledge that change 
occurs all the time—so what is the bare particularist to say? Pickavance says that one 
must point to the special nature of the properties themselves. However, we cannot 
simply categorize properties as either essential or accidental, as the existence of only one 
property that is accidental in one substance and essential in another will force the bare 
particularist to look elsewhere to make sense of the different roles of essential and 
accidental properties.33  
 On the “coincidental” view of accidental predication, Pickavance thinks that the 
question becomes how “a substance’s accidental properties can be constituents of it”.34 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 99.  
 
33 Ibid., 103.  
 
34 Ibid., 104.  
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Remember, on this “coincidental” view, the substance together with the accidental 
property forms a coincidental, which has, as a constituent, the substance. Pickavance 
breaks down the question into two puzzles: 
There are two parts of this puzzlement. First, what is the whole, if there is one, 
whose constituents include all of b(t) and t’s essential and accidental 
properties…[second] and maybe more importantly, what is the complex whole, if 
there is one, composed of b(t) tied to the accidental property of being juicy?35 
 
On this complicated view of accidental predication, the accidental properties seem to 
become independent substances—a bare particular “tied” to a property. This results in all 
change being substantial, which is a hard position to defend. 
 Pickavance ends his paper with some motivation for further work with bare 
particulars. He thinks that the questions of accidental predication and change raise 
important questions for bare particularism. In contrast to Moreland’s sentiment that bare 
particulars ought only to be used for individuation, Pickavance thinks that bare 
particularism should follow Aristotle by implicating substrates in accounts of change, 
unification, and other phenomena—but why not simply adopt Aristotelian 
hylemorphism? 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 Ibid.  
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BUNDLE THEORY 
 
 The other major player in the contemporary accounts of substance game is 
bundle theory. I will first survey some of the literature on bundle theory before focused 
on two “sophisticated” versions of bundle theory: Peter Simons’ Nuclear Theory of 
substance and Markku Keinanen’s Strong Nuclear Theory of substance. But first, I will 
look at some of the other, classic versions of bundle theory laid out of James van Cleve 
and Albert Casullo. 
 In his paper, “Three Versions of Bundle Theory”,36 James van Cleve discusses 
two classic versions of bundle theory in addition to his own formulation. He finds fault 
with the first two and he thinks his own version has a hefty price tag, hinting at a 
conversion back to Aristotelian substance.37 The first bundle theory van Cleve discusses 
is a crude version targeted by six objections. He defines this formulation as follows:  
It could be said that a thing is a set of which properties are its members, or that it 
is a whole of which properties are its parts. Perhaps there are other possibilities, 
too, but the idea in any case would be (i) that a thing is a complex entity of which 
properties are the sole constituents, and (ii) that for a thing to have or exemplify a 
property is for that property to be a constituent of it.38 
 
                                                 
36 James van Cleve, “Three Versions of Bundle Theory,” Philosophical Studies: An International 
Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 47, no. 1 (1985): 95-107. 
 
37 Ibid., 105. 
 
38 Ibid., 95.  
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The first three objections van Cleve levels against bundle theory are sufficient grounds 
to reformulate bundle theory as to become a more viable theory of substance. First, if a 
thing is nothing but a collection of properties, then any collection of properties would be 
a thing and every possible set of properties would, in fact, be a thing. This is simply 
absurd. Second, it seems that a thing, as a set of properties, would be an eternal, 
necessary thing. And third, that “exemplification cannot be analyzed simply as the 
converse of membership. Redness is a member of {redness, roundness}, but it would be 
absurd—a category mistake—to say that that set is red”.39 The other three objections are 
applicable to the second version of bundle theory, so I will discuss them there. 
 The second bundle theory van Cleve puts forward says that a thing is not simply a 
bundle of properties, but rather a bundle where the properties stand in relation to one 
another in a certain way. This relation is sometimes referred to as “co-instantiation”, or 
“compresence”, or “consubstantiation”. This relation is commonly explained as a 
relation that “relates a number of properties just in case they are all properties of one and 
the same individual”.40 As van Cleve notes, the most important feature of this view is 
that “co-instantiation” is a contingent relation, meaning that two or more properties that 
stand in relation to one another do so contingently, not necessarily. This more nuanced 
version of bundle theory avoids the three objections discussed above, but van Cleve 
thinks the final three objections still deserve close attention. 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 96.  
 
40 Ibid., 97.  
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 This first objection (fourth overall) states that a thing, if understood as a bundle 
of properties, cannot change as a set cannot change its members. Van Cleve thinks that 
the process of change is still a problem for this second version of bundle theory. On this 
view, the relations can change between properties, but this is not the same as saying an 
individual is changing; with change, a new set of properties “super-cedes” the old and a 
new individual replaces the old. It seems, therefore, that this view cannot account for 
change of an individual over time, or accidental change.  
 The next objection deals with accidental predication, which, as you might recall, 
was a bit concern for bare particularism. If a thing is a bundle of properties, then it has 
its members essentially, meaning that it could not have had any other properties than it 
does. For the full force of this objection, consider that a thing might not have existed if 
the properties constituting it never were co-instantiated, but, we cannot say that an 
individual thing might have had other properties than it does since it has been 
established that a new collection of co-instantiated properties is a new individual. So for 
a thing to have properties other than what constitutes it now would for it to be a wholly 
different thing. Van Cleve suggests that by postulating an inner core bundle we might be 
able to avoid this objection—but more on this with Simons and Keinanen. 
 The final objection that van Cleve raises for our second version of bundle theory 
is that this bundle theory implies “a dubious version of PII [the Principle of the Identity 
of Indiscernibles]”.41 He thinks that a defender of bundle theory might (and probably 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 101.  
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does) opt for tropes, rather than universals, as properties. But van Cleve does not agree 
with tropes as properties as they “belong to the category of particulars rather than to the 
category of properties. A particular redness seems really to be a special kind of red 
particular”.42  
 In order to avoid all six objections, van Cleve formulates a third version of 
bundle theory which he says is of his own creation. He likens this version to a “new 
phenomenalism” in which we “decline to identify individuals with complexes of 
properties, offering instead to translate any statement ostensibly about individuals into a 
statement exclusively about properties”.43 The upshot of this view is that we are unable 
to talk about individuals since the only logical subjects in this ontology are properties of 
the Platonic variety. Van Cleve concludes by acknowledging that this version of bundle 
theory, while tenable, is highly unattractive, as the result is a world without things.  
 In a later paper, Albert Casullo responds to van Cleve’s objections against bundle 
theory and, in the process, introduces a novel version of bundle theory immune to the 
“dubious version of PII” objection. As van Cleve also noted, bundle theory can be taken 
to mean many things; Casullo defines the view as being committed to “(1): A thing is a 
complex of properties which all stand in some contingent relation, call it co-
instantiation, to one another”.44 Casullo summarizes van Cleve’s first two objections, 
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44 Albert Casullo, “A Fourth Version of Bundle Theory,” Philosophical Studies: An International 
Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 54, no. 1 (1988): 125-139. 
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(01) the problem of change and (02) accidental predication, and states that these 
objections raise two problems for the bundle theorist: (a) individuation, and (b) identity 
across time. Furthermore, individuation requires one to understand the relation between 
a thing and its properties, which, in turn, requires further explanation of two facts: (i) 
that things have properties in common with other things, and (ii) that each thing is 
distinct/different from each other thing. According to Casullo, bundle theorists take 
properties to be universals, so (i) is not a concern as universals are capable of multiple 
instantiation. But (ii) is a concern as it would seem that complexes of properties (i.e. 
things) are also multiply instantiable. Therefore, the bundle theorist must look beyond 
properties for an answer to the problem of change. 
 In order to account for identity across time, the bundle theorist needs to postulate 
an enduring, unchanging entity that Casullo calls a continuant. Now, since (a) and (b) 
are distinct problems, Casullo thinks that the bundle theorist can give different solutions 
to each. Following Bergmann, Casullo thinks that the bundle theorist can solve the 
question of identity over time by adopting (2): an enduring thing is a series of 
momentary things all of which stand in some contingent relation R.45 For this to work, a 
bare particular must serve as an individuator of momentary cross sections of time. There 
are no continuants; a “thing” endures across time via individual temporal cross sections 
that stand in relation to one another. Casullo says that (2) is universally accepted by 
major proponents of bundle theory. However, the bundle theorist cannot stop at (2), as 
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this is only a solution to identity across time, not individuation at a momentary cross 
section. Therefore, the bundle theorist ought to reformulate (1) into “(1*): a momentary 
thing is a complex of properties which all stand in the relation of co-instantiation to one 
another”.46 Casullo thinks that van Cleve and others misconstrue the bundle theorist’s 
position and by accepting both (1*) and (2), one can give two solutions to two separate 
problems: individuation and identity across time.  
 Having clarified the bundle theorist’s general position, Casullo now develops two 
new versions of bundle theory: strong bundle theory (SBT) and weak bundle theory 
(WBT). SBT states that “a momentary physical thing is necessarily identical to a 
complex of mutually co-instantiated properties”.47 In contrast, WBT goes for the softer 
claim, “contingently identical” rather than necessarily identical. Casullo thinks that WBT 
has an advantage over SBT because it is not committed to the necessary truth of the 
Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. Casullo thinks that both SBT and WBT are 
immune to van Cleve’s third objection (concerning PII) and therefore bundle theory can 
be a fashionable position. 
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Nuclear Theory 
 
 In his classic paper, “Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of 
Substance”, Peter Simons surveys the ontological landscape and finds that both 
substratum and bundle theories have their share of problems. Instead, he formulates his 
famous nuclear theory, which he claims is neither a bundle or substratum theory. 
According to Simons’ nuclear theory, every object consists of an inner, nuclear bundle 
and its outer, accidental tropes. The nuclear bundle is in the “style”48 of Husserl, who 
used a special “foundation relation” to avoid regress. Simons thinks that this theory 
avoids common objections to both bundle theories and substratum theories. 
 To differentiate nuclear theory from other bundle substance theories, Simons 
takes a two-stage approach.  
In the first stage, we have a collection of tropes which must all co-occur as 
individuals. These form an essential kernel or nucleus of the substance…[such] a 
nucleus forms the individual essence or individual nature of a substance, but will 
usually not be a complete substance, since there are further, non-essential 
properties that the substance has. The nucleus will require supplementation by 
tropes of certain determinable kinds, but nor require particular individual tropes 
of these kinds: its dependence will be specific, not individual.49 
 
                                                 
48 Peter Simons, “Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance,” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, no. 3 (Sep., 1994): 567. 
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This inner nucleus serves as the substratum for the outer, accidental tropes and the 
substance itself. In this way, nuclear theory combines parts of substratum theory and 
bundle theory.  
 In order for the inner nucleus to act as the substratum, it must be bound together 
in a special way. Simons favors the way Husserl dealt with the regress resulting from 
unity being grounded in always another item, and therefore no unity can be achieved.  
Husserl’s solution was to designate a special relation for the tropes of the inner nucleus: 
the foundation relation. This relation “binds things into a unity without requiring any 
further glue”.50 If left at just that, it is unclear what one is taking as primitive, but 
Husserl made an important distinction: weak foundation and strong foundation. Simons 
says of this distinction: 
An individual A is weakly founded on an individual B iff A is necessarily such 
that it cannot exist unless B exists. An object is weakly founded on its essential 
proper parts. But there is another sense of foundation, more appropriate here, 
which says that A is strongly founded on B iff A is weakly founded on B and B is 
not a part of A.51 
 
In order for this to work, foundation needs to be understood as operating at the species 
level; this account requires one to speak of “objects of a sort” requiring “objects of 
another sort”.52 Simons notes that this only works when talking about cases of essential 
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compresence, meaning that more must be done to understand particular instances of this 
or that trope.  
 Another key part of Husserl’s influence on nuclear theory is the notion of a 
foundational system. Simons borrows the Husserlian notion of a “whole in the pregnant 
sense”53 to argue that two particulars are directly foundationally related if either a weak 
or strong foundation holds between them. In other words, one must be founded—weakly 
or strongly—on the other. Furthermore, a foundational relation is present when two 
particulars bear “the ancestral of the relation of the direct foundational relatedness to one 
another”.54 Simons uses these to postulate a foundational system which is present when 
all members are foundationally related to one another, and, importantly, no member is 
foundationally related to anything outside the “collection”. The upshot of this 
“foundational system” is that the dependence needs of all members are satisfied within 
the collection thereby connecting all members of the collection. Simons supplements 
this with a principle: “a collection of particulars, all of whose foundational needs are met 
within the collection, is itself independent”.55 Now, Simons has established that the inner 
nucleus of a substance is not simply a group of random tropes, but rather it is a 
collection of tropes that, by their nature, are founded on one another to form a unified, 
independent nucleus.  
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 Having discussed the nature of the inner nucleus of Simons’ substance, we can 
now look at the outer, accidental tropes. These tropes depend on the inner core for their 
existence, but the nucleus only needs one member of a given trope family (e.g., a red 
trope is determinate and therefore the color family of tropes is the determinable). Simons 
formulates this two-stage approach to help account for change; having established an 
inner nucleus that forms the individual essence of the substance, it is clear that a 
substance can “shed” its outer tropes and gain new ones, of the same family, while 
maintaining a continuing identity as the same substance.  
 Simons thinks that his nuclear theory has a few advantages over competing views 
of substance. First, he thinks that his view allows for flexibility. The inner nucleus can 
be complex, or simple; the outer, accidental tropes (“halo”) can be legion or even non-
existent. Simons thinks that his view can accommodate Leibnizian monads: substances 
composed solely of an inner nucleus of tropes, meaning that all properties are essential. 
These might be the building blocks of the universe and the only change they can undergo 
is complete annihilation. Another kind of flexibility would be to allow for the outer halo 
to be composed of “clumps” rather than individual accidental tropes. These clumps 
would have a type of nucleus that satisfies some of its dependence needs, relying on the 
substantial nucleus for the rest its needs. Simons ends his paper calling others to fortify 
nuclear bundle theory; his call was answered recently by Markku Keinanen. 
 
 
 
27 
 
Strong Nuclear Theory 
 
 In a recent paper, “Tropes – The Basic Constituents of Powerful Particulars”, 
Markku Keinanen builds on Simons nuclear theory to formulate an updated version of 
this sophisticated bundle theory. To this end, Keinanen first finds fault with Simons’ 
nuclear theory, then discusses Brian Ellis’ dispositional essentialism to show the utility 
of a dispositionalist view of properties. Keinanen finds Ellis’ ontology to have redundant 
postulations, favoring the “qualitative economy”56 of a trope ontology. Keinanen’s 
strong nuclear theory (SNT) is the result. 
 Keinanen identifies three problems for Simons’ nuclear theory. First, nuclear 
theory allows for substances constituted only by an inner nucleus without an outer, 
accidental halo of tropes. The problem lies in understanding what kind of substances can 
exist like this (i.e., without non-essential properties). The second problem Keinanen 
brings up is that nuclear theory does not prohibit two or more tropes that are in the same 
family (i.e., determinable) from constituting the same substance at the same time. If this 
is the case, then we could not know why the substance exemplifies such and such a 
determinate trope, given that (possibly) many similar determinable tropes constitute the 
same substance at the same time. The final problem with Simons’ nuclear theory is that 
the “formal relations of rigid and generic dependence do not constrain the spatio-
                                                 
56 Markku Keinanen, “Tropes – The Basis Constituents of Powerful Particulars,” Dialectica 65, 
no. 3 (2011): 420.  
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temporal locations of tropes in any manner”.57 This means that the constituent tropes of 
a substance are not necessarily “close-by” to one another either temporally or spatially, 
so to speak. For these reasons, Keinanen finds Simons’ nuclear theory to be inadequate; 
major adaptations are necessary to keep a nuclear bundle theory viable. 
 In order to adopt a dispositional notion of properties in his thesis, strong nuclear 
theory, Keinanen first discusses Ellis’s dispositional essentialism. Ellis’ view rests on 
two pillars: (a) a strict dispositionalist conception of natural properties and (b) that every 
substance belongs to some natural kind. The first pillar states that “a dispositional 
property kind universal (kind of property tropes) specifies a generic natural kind of 
processes, which the objects instantiating the property necessarily undergo in certain 
circumstances”.58 Basically, these dispositional properties necessarily give a substance 
definite causal powers. The second pillar—that all substances belong to some natural 
kind—says “each natural kind K has a real essence constituted by the necessary intrinsic 
properties of a substance belonging to kind K”.59 In other words, since every substance 
belongs to a natural kind, the essential properties, or necessary intrinsic properties, of 
that substance are illustrative of the real essence of the kind the substance belongs to.  
 Keinanen presents SNT as a development of Simons’ nuclear theory, and indeed 
it is highly developed. I will quote the detailed theses of the theory and then discuss key 
parts in greater detail. 
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[SN1]: Any powerful particular, i, contains at least one nuclear trope. If it 
contains more than one nuclear trope, then the nuclear tropes are strongly rigidly 
dependent on each other. The nuclear tropes are necessary to i and determine the 
primary kind K to which i belongs. 
[SN2]: Let 𝐷1….. 𝐷𝑘 be a group of the distinct highest determinables, i.e., 
determinable kinds of tropes. Each nuclear trope of i necessarily falls under some 
of the determinables 𝐷1….. 𝐷𝑘. There is at most one nuclear trope falling under 
each of these determinables. 
[SN3]: Any trope t of a powerful particular of kind K is generically dependent 
sde [self-dependencies excluded] on the tropes falling under each of the 
determinables 𝐷1….. 𝐷𝑘. 
[SN4]: Assume that powerful particular i of kind K has two or more nuclear 
tropes. There must exist tropes falling under each of the determinables 𝐷1….. 𝐷𝑘 
rigidly dependent sde on the nuclear tropes of i. Each such trope is a part of some 
trope aggregate that is a part of i. Substance i does not have any other 
constituents. 
     Assume that substance i of kind K has a single nuclear trope. The above holds 
with the exception that there are no tropes falling under the same determinable D 
as the nuclear trope rigidly dependent on the nuclear trope. 
     If there is a nuclear trope of i falling under determinable D, there are no 
further tropes falling under D rigidly dependent on the nuclear tropes of i. 
[SN5]: Trope t is a part of power particular i if and only if either t is the only 
nuclear trope of i (and t is not rigidly dependent on any trope) or the nuclear 
tropes of i are the only tropes on which t is rigidly dependent. 
[SN6]: Assume that powerful particular i of kind K is constituted solely by its 
nuclear tropes falling under determinables 𝐷1….. 𝐷𝑘. The powerful particulars of 
this specific type are among the minimal entities instantiating the basic spatio-
temporal relations. 
[SN7]: In addition to the substances fulfilling the conditions of [SN6], the 
following two kinds of trope aggregates are individuals that instantiate the basic 
spatio-temporal relations: 
 [1]: The trope nucleus of each powerful particular i (the n-bundle). The 
spatio-temporal location of the nucleus of each powerful particular i determines 
the spatio-temporal location of i. 
 [2]: Each trope bundle formed by the nucleus of some powerful particular 
i and single trope t one-sidedly rigidly dependent only on the nuclear tropes of i 
(the c-bundle). 
[SN8]: The interval of time in which a c-bundle of substance i is located is a 
proper or improper part of the interval of time in which the n-bundle of i is 
located. 
[SN9]: Necessarily, every property trope t is a part of some powerful particular i, 
i.e., it is neither the sole nuclear trope of some simple substance i or rigidly 
dependent only on the nuclear tropes of i. 
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[SN10]: Simple substances are trope bundles in which all of the rigid 
dependencies of their constituent tropes are fulfilled. Therefore, they are strongly 
independent particulars.60 
 
 
Keinanen lays out the conditions for tropes being part of substances in [SN1] – [SN5]. In 
order to combat the spatio-temporal location objection he raised against Simon’s nuclear 
theory, he gives us thesis [SN6]. Continuing on the theme of location, Keinanen also 
introduced three additional principles to help constrain the spatio-temporal location of 
tropes. To paraphrase, nuclear tropes are necessarily compresent and the location of the 
aggregate of nuclear tropes determines the spatio-temporal location of the substance. In 
contrast, contingent tropes are not necessarily compresent with the substance nor with 
one another. However, each contingent trope of a substance occupies a spatio-temporal 
location “that is a proper or improper part of the area occupied by [the substance]”.61 
 Key to SNT is the distinction between the c-bundles and the n-bundles. The n-
bundle is the aggregate of nuclear tropes of every simple substance—this aggregate 
forms an individual that “locates” the substance. The c-bundle is the trope aggregate 
formed by contingent tropes and their respective nuclear substance. The n-bundles are 
aggregates of tropes that are mutually rigidly dependent on one another while the c-
bundles are aggregates of contingent tropes that are rigidly dependent on their respective 
nuclear bundle. [SN8] also deals with the relationship between the c-bundle and the n-
bundle. Keinanen argues that, since monadic properties are dispositional, there must be a 
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“centre of influence”62 within each substance that acts as the “source” of its causal 
power. 
 To conclude the paper, Keinanen explicitly states that SNT “rejects primitive 
substances and substrata as redundant postulations… [and that], as a trope nominalist 
position, the SNT rejects substantial kind universals”.63 For SNT, natural kinds (in the 
Aristotelian sense) are done away with; SNT says a substance is a member of a primary 
kind because it possesses nuclear tropes that belong to a certain determinate kind. In 
contrast, a neo-Aristotelian might say that a substance is a member of a natural kind, and 
therefore it has certain properties. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, I have looked at some of the contemporary accounts of substance. 
While there are many games in town, bare particularism and bundle theory represent, in 
my opinion, the most viable options outside of traditional hylemorphism. The bare 
particularist emphasizes the unity that a substratum gives us, while the bundle theorist 
praises the dynamic nature and flexibility of bundles. But do we need both unity and 
dynamism? Can we settle for theory of substance that leaves important questions 
unanswered? I think that in order to address all of the explananda we are familiar with, 
we need a rich ontology that can account for the unity of substance as well as change. 
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Furthermore, nothing has been said about teleology up to this point, and I think that 
intrinsic finality is a distinct advantage of hylemorphism—other theories cannot account 
for the unified actions of substances towards a narrow range of ends. That being said, I 
will now discuss the hylemorphism of Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas. 
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CHAPTER III 
HYLEMORPHISM 
 
 Any discussion of hylemorphism should be accompanied by a discussion of 
change. For A-T, the reality of change provides motivation to postulate the theory of 
hylemorphism. While complicated, this theory can support different types of change—
allowing for the important distinction between accidental and substantial change. In 
order to do this, A-T must first explicate substance, highlighting the distinctions between 
substance and accident, essence and property, and matter and form. All these concepts 
come into play when discussing change.  
 In this chapter, I will first explain what is meant by substance for A-T. 
Distinctions between substance – accident and essence – property will be made, 
highlighting some of the major differences between traditional hylemorphism and 
contemporary accounts of substance. Next, I will discuss the role of matter. Following 
the traditional terminology, both prime matter and secondary matter will be explicated. 
Prime matter has always been a mystery for those who take it seriously, and I will have 
more on this mysterious character in the next chapter as well. Then, I will uncover what 
is meant by form in A-T metaphysics. The final section of this chapter will look at some 
contemporary defenders of hylemorphism and highlight a few clarifications that they 
make given the contemporary debates on substance. 
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TRADITIONAL HYLEMORPHISM 
 
 Thomistic hylemorphism holds that a substance is a composite of matter and 
form. However, it is critical to note that this composite is not like a “bundle” of matter 
and form, but rather this hylemorphism is a substratum theory. Like bare particularism in 
the previous chapter, Thomistic hylemorphism is committed to a constituent ontology 
comprised of a substratum plus properties—one key difference being that for 
hylemorphism the substratum is non-individuating (more on this in the next chapter). 
Substances are composed of matter and form; this two-fold composition reflects the 
mixture of actuality and potentiality in finite substances. For A-T, the reality of change 
necessitates this composition. The act-potency distinction is arguably the foundation of 
A-T metaphysics and therefore the importance of substance—this composite of matter 
and form, act and potency—becomes clear.  
Unlike in the previous chapter on contemporary accounts of substance, Aquinas 
means something rather specific by the term substance. Aquinas, following Aristotle, 
comes to an understanding of substance in a very deliberate and detailed manner. 
Aristotle describes the “science” of metaphysics as being about substance, but even for 
Aristotle this term means many things. In his commentaries on Aristotle, Aquinas often 
ties works together making it much easier to follow the overall framework that Aristotle 
is setting up throughout his collected works. Concerning substance specifically, 
Aristotle’s Categories and Metaphysics are the primary sources; Aquinas’ commentary 
on Aristotle’s Metaphysics is one of the best places to find an archive (of sorts) of what 
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Aristotle meant by substance. The first major distinction made is between first and 
second substance: 
Hence he [Aristotle] concludes that it is necessary to establish the truth “about 
this,” i.e., about this subject or first substance, because such a subject seems in 
the truest sense to be substance. Therefore, in the Categories it is said that such 
substance is said to be substance properly, principally and chiefly. For substances 
of this kind are by their very nature the subjects of all other things, namely, of 
species, genera and accidents; whereas second substance, i.e., genera and 
species, are the subjects of accidents alone. And they also have this nature only 
by reason of these first substances; for man is white inasmuch as this man is 
white.64 
 
The distinction between a concrete particular (in an informal, non-loaded sense!) and the 
genera or species is very clear, and it is likewise clear that substance can be used in both 
ways. The primacy of first substance (i.e. the individual subject) is apparent once one 
considers that all other things are predicated of first substance. To use Aquinas’ 
example: “man, animal, rational, capable of laughter and white are predicated of 
Socrates. However, a subject is not itself predicated of anything else, and this must be 
understood essentially.”65  Hence, it is the subject that is first substance and it is this 
meaning of substance that A-T then breaks down into its composite of matter and form, 
act and potency. 
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 In order to rationalize the need for a composite, A-T first discusses the everyday 
phenomenon of change, or the movement from potency to act. The opening lines of 
Aquinas’ early work, De Principiis Naturae, note the need for change.  He begins: 
Since some things can be, although they are not, and some things now are; those 
which can be and are not are said to be potency, but those which already exist are 
said to be in act. But existence is twofold: one is essential existence or the 
substantial existence of a thing, for example man exists, and this is existence 
simpliciter. The other is accidental existence, for example man is white, and this 
is existence secundum quid.66 
 
These influential lines introduce a foundational distinction for A-T: the substantial-
accidental distinction. Aquinas describes substantial existence as “essential”; in contrast, 
accidental existence is “secundum quid” or “following after something”, “qualified”. For 
A-T, substances are composed of something essential as well as something accidental: 
substances have a substantial form, that which makes a thing the kind of thing that it is, 
and accidental form that modifies the subject.  
 Another way to understand the distinction between substance and accident is to 
consider being itself. For A-T, either a thing exists independently (subsists) or a thing 
exists in, or inheres in, another. The former is substance and the latter are accidents. 
Substances are independently existing and serve as the substratum for accidents, which 
inhere in substance. In figure 1 on the following page (37), I have diagrammed  
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Figure 1: Diagram of Substance 
Substance
Simple
GOD
Composite
Created
Substance
Basic
Immaterial
Immaterial Substance
Essence is identical 
with Substance
e.g.
Angel Gabriel qua 
Angel Gabriel
Material
Material Substance
(Hylemorphic 
Composite)
Prime Matter
+
Substantial Form
Essence is identical 
with Hylemorphic 
Composite
e.g.
Socrates qua Man
Complex 
Immaterial
Immaterial 
Accidental Unity
Immaterial Substance 
+
Accidental Form
e.g. 
Thinking Angel 
Gabriel
Material
Accidental Unity
(Hylemorphic 
Composite)
Material Substance 
+
Accidental Form
e.g. 
Sitting Socrates
(or any "thick" 
particular)
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substance. As you will notice, God is the only substance that is (1) uncreated, and (2) 
simple, or without accidents—meaning that there is nothing non-essential in God. 
Furthermore, within the category of “created substance”, A-T provides a framework to 
explain both immaterial and material substances. Since God is the only substance that is 
simple, or without accidents, then all created substances are composites. In material 
substances, this composition is that of prime matter and substantial form. Therefore, 
hylemorphism is a theory about the matter-form composition in substance, which is 
unique to material substances. 
From looking at figure 1, one may wonder why A-T would complicate the 
metaphysics of substance by postulating the “sub-theory” of hylemorphism. The answer 
is simple: hylemorphism, as a theory, addresses the problem of how members of the 
same kind can exist in the material world—how can these material substances be both 
similar and dissimilar? Famously, Aquinas held that there cannot be more than one 
member of any essential kind in immaterial substances as there is no matter to 
individuate them from one another. Hylemorphism makes a distinction between two 
types of matter and two types of form in order to address change and individuation. I 
will now sketch out the theory of hylemorphism. 
Implicit in the opening lines of De Principiis Naturae is the idea that nothing 
comes from nothing, meaning that if change is a real feature of the world, then what 
comes to be must come from something. Furthermore, since we observe different kinds 
of change in the natural world, it seems necessary to postulate different “somethings” 
from which changes occur. For hylemorphism, the “somethings” from which changes 
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occur is matter. Aquinas argues that both substantial and accidental existence have a 
potency, namely, matter: “for example sperm is the matter of man and man is the matter 
of whiteness”.67 Now, the scientific truth of this statement is not of interest, what is 
important is role of matter in both the substantial and accidental. “Sperm [as] the matter 
of man” contrasted with “man [as] the matter of whiteness” gives us an understanding of 
why A-T must distinguish between two types of matter. We need matter that exists in 
potency to substantial form as well as matter that exists in potency to accidental form; 
matter is the “something” from which change occurs.  
 The two types of matter in A-T metaphysics are prime matter and secondary 
matter, or the subject/substance. Aquinas clarifies what is meant by “matter”: 
But these differ, because that which is in potency to substantial existence is 
called the matter from which, but that which is in potency to accidental existence 
is called the matter in which. Again, properly speaking, that which is in potency 
to substantial existence is called prime matter, but that which is in potency to 
accidental existence is called the subject. Thus we say that accidents are in a 
subject; but we do not say that the substantial form is in a subject.68 
 
Secondary matter, which is the substance itself as the substratum, as the matter in which 
accidental change can occur is perfectly intuitive—the substance itself survives an 
accidental change and thereby ties, in terms of time, the substance after an accidental 
change to the substance prior, in time, to the accidental change. The substance changes 
something non-essential, as any substantial change would destroy the substance. 
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 In contrast, substantial change requires a much different kind of matter: prime 
matter. Prime matter exists in potency to substantial form. It is truly an odd thing to 
think about “because all knowledge and every definition comes by way of the form, [so] 
prime matter cannot be defined or known in itself but only through the composite”.69 We 
come to know that prime matter exists precisely in the context of substantial change. In 
order for substantial change to be a real feature of the world, given that nothing comes 
from nothing, something must be in potency to act as the “from which” a new substance 
comes to be. Substances do not simply “pop” into existence—this would be absurd. 
Aquinas uses a bronze statue to illustrate the difference between prime matter and 
secondary matter: 
We should notice, too, that some matter has a composition of form, for example 
bronze. For, although it is matter with respect to the statue, the bronze itself is 
composed of matter and form. Therefore, bronze is not called prime matter, even 
though it has matter. However, that matter which is understood without any form 
and privation, but rather is subject to form and privation, is called prime matter 
by the reason of the fact that there is no other matter before it.70 
 
In accidental change, the substance survives as the subject of change; in substantial 
change, prime matter is the subject of change. One might interject that prime matter, too, 
must have some form and must thereby explain its own composition—but Aquinas 
disagrees. Prime matter is unknowable in itself; it becomes known in the context of 
substantial change. 
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Prime matter, by definition, is without form and therefore it cannot be generated 
or corrupted. Aquinas comes to this strange conclusion by thinking about generation in 
general: in generation something comes from something, meaning that from something 
comes some other thing. Matter changes and terminates in some other form. If prime 
matter could also change, then it would lead to an infinite regress, since a further 
composite would need to explain prime matter’s change, and so on. This argument also 
applies to form itself. For A-T, only the composite can be generated or corrupted; form 
and prime matter cannot. 
 As matter exists as the potency in both substantial and accidental existence, so 
form inheres in matter and thereby actualizes it. Substances, being composites of matter 
and form that reflect the act-potency composition found in all things, are themselves 
what they are by means of form. Aquinas argues: 
But, just as everything which is in potency can be called matter, so also 
everything from which something has existence whether that existence be 
substantial or accidental, can be called form; for example, man, since he is white 
in potency, becomes actually white through whiteness, and sperm, since it is man 
in potency, becomes actually man through the soul. Also, because form causes 
existence in act, we say that the form is the act. However, that which causes 
substantial existence in act is called substantial form and that which causes 
accidental existence in act is called accidental form.71 
 
Now we can say that a substance exists as such due to its substantial form and that 
accidental form causes something to “come into being as this, for example when a man 
comes into being as white, we do not say simpliciter that man comes into being or is 
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generated, but that he comes into being or is generated as white somehow.”72 Substantial 
form is introduced in an instance of substantial change, where generation or corruption 
takes place; accidental form is introduced in an instance of accidental change, and the 
subject comes to exist as this or in a certain way.  
 To recap, a material substance is a hylemorphic composite of prime matter and 
substantial form. The substance, as such, is independently existing and it serves as the 
substratum for accidents, or, more precisely, for accidental form. Just as prime matter is 
the substratum for substantial form in a material substance, so secondary matter (the 
subject/substance itself) serves as the substratum for accidental form. When substantial 
form inheres in prime matter, together they compose a material substance; when 
accidental form inheres in secondary matter, which is the substance itself, together they 
compose an accidental unity. An accidental unity is a “thick” particular, or an ordinary 
object of our experience. To visualize the hylemorphic composition, refer to figure 2 on 
the following page (43).  
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Figure 2: Hylemorphic Composition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 At this point in the discussion of hylemorphism, it is important to understand 
how essence fits into the story. For A-T, essence, or “quiddity, essential structure, or 
nature”,73 is distinct from substance and substantial form in material substances. 
Aquinas, commenting on book VII of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, says: 
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Regarding essence, it should first of all be borne in mind that it must be 
predicated of a thing essentially; for those things which are predicated of a thing 
accidentally do not belong to its essence. For by the essence of a thing we mean 
the proper answer which can be given to the question asking what it is. And 
when we ask what a thing is we cannot give a proper answer by mentioning 
attributes which belong to it accidentally; for when someone asks what man is, 
one cannot answer that he is white or sitting or musical. Hence none of those 
attributes which are predicated of a thing accidentally belong to its essence; for 
being you is not being musical.74 
 
From this, we know that essence can be contrasted with accident, which is anything that 
belongs to substance without necessity. This distinction between essence and accident is 
important for hylemorphism as it allows one to distinguish between essence and 
property, as properties are but one kind of accident. For A-T, the essence of a thing is 
“the concept ‘which expresses what each thing is,’ i.e., which describes the predicate, 
‘but does not contain the thing itself,’ i.e., the subject, will be the concept of the essence 
in each particular thing. Hence animal belongs to the essence of man”.75 
While essence is that which makes a thing knowable, accidents are what makes a 
thing exist in this or that way. There are two kinds of accidents for A-T: proper and 
contingent. Proper accidents are those accidents that flow from the essence or nature of a 
thing. By “flow”, A-T simply means that proper accidents are formally caused by, and 
originate from, the essence. In contrast, contingent accidents are those accidents that are 
contingent to a natural kind essence. However, A-T think there are two types of 
contingent accidents: inseparable and separable. Inseparable contingent accidents are 
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those accidents that are contingent to a natural kind essence, but are inseparable from a 
particular substance (e.g., gender properties). Separable contingent accidents are those 
accidents that are contingent to a natural kind essence, and are separable from a 
particular substance (e.g., hair color, etc.). I will note that proper accidents are similar to 
“essential properties” as the term is used today, although A-T are explicit that the 
essence is distinct from any accidents/properties.  
 In defining the essence of a thing one cannot make reference to the subject in the 
definition. For instance, say we have a wet dog. Aquinas would contend that “wetness” 
cannot be part of the essence of dog because, to be a dog, a thing need not be wet. 
Furthermore, what it means to be wet is far different from what it means to be a dog.  
Aquinas continues to say that: 
 Thus it is clear that essence will not be found in any of those things which are not 
classed among the species of some genus, but “in these alone,” i.e., in the species 
alone. For species alone may be defined, since every definition is composed of 
genus and difference. But that which is contained under a genus and is 
constituted of differences is a species, and therefore definition pertains only to 
species. For species alone seem not to be predicated according to participation 
and affection or as an accident.76 
 
 
For A-T, empirical observation and science in general colors in the picture of the natural 
world, so to speak. The role of metaphysics is to describe the structure of reality and 
being as such, not to catalogue all the plants and animals. This understanding of essence 
is basically a species concept of sorts. Therefore, it is important to have as much data 
and observation as possible in order to “get it right” in terms of defining a species so that 
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its specific difference is highlighted, that which makes the substance unique and easily 
identifiable. In the case of human beings, it is generally established that we are rational 
animals, and this is an example Aquinas uses. He says that “animal is predicated of man 
essentially, and in a similar way rational is predicated of animal. Hence the 
expression rational animal is the definition of man”.77 It is critical to note that this 
notion of essence (and A-T metaphysics in general) is not hopelessly committed to the 
science contemporaneous with Aquinas himself, nor to the science of the twenty-first 
century. I would argue that A-T metaphysics is even more appealing today than it ever 
has been precisely because of the success of science over the years. 
 
CONTEMPORARY HYLEMORPHISM 
 
 While hylemorphism has historically dominated much of Western philosophy, 
especially during the Middle Ages, it remains a fringe view in metaphysics today. Many 
are attracted to versions of bundle theory or bare particularism in order to avoid the 
ontological commitments associated with hylemorphism. However, several defenders of 
hylemorphism have continued to carry the torch, making sense of historical critiques and 
novel objections against this theory. Three such defenders are Anna Marmodoro, David 
Oderberg, and Edward Feser. I will briefly look at some of their work in order to set up 
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my defense of hylemorphism against nuclear bundle theory and bare particularism in the 
next chapter. 
 Marmodoro wrote a paper in response to some “reconditioned” versions of 
Aristotle’s hylemorphism. In this paper, she argues that all three reconditioned versions 
are motivated by a misunderstanding of traditional hylemorphism. She says that 
“Aristotle is often presented as championing mereological hylomorphism, which treats 
the matter and form of a substance as parts of the substance…I side with the line of 
interpretation according to which Aristotle is not a mereological hylomorphist”.78 Not 
only does she believe that these reconditioning attempts fail to capture traditional 
hylemorphism, but she argues that these reconditioned versions make the argument for 
Aristotle’s own hylemorphism even stronger. 
 First, she addresses Kathryn Koslicki’s development of the hylemorphic 
composition in which the unity of the substance is “derived or borrowed from the unity 
of one of its parts”.79 Koslicki thinks that a substance is unified by the “ultimate 
mereological atom”80 in a substance, which she says is the substantial form. But 
Marmodoro notes that implicit in this is the notion that this oneness of the substantial 
form (the mereological atom) amounts to its simplicity. Koslicki thinks that this does not 
work well because the substantial form itself is divisible, as a form of a substance has 
parts. Therefore, substantial form cannot be the atom of the substance, and therefore the 
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unity of substance comes into question. Marmodoro responds to Koslicki by noting that 
Aristotle explicitly thought that the unity of a substance comes from the metaphysical 
unity “attained in the hylomorphic compound”.81 Furthermore, Marmodoro clarifies 
Aristotle’s understanding of the role of substantial form in the composite: the oneness of 
a substance comes from the substantial form inhering in the matter of the substance. 
 Next, Marmodoro addresses some of the work E.J. Lowe has done on 
hylemorphism. Lowe’s reconditioning attempt questions the role of prime matter in 
traditional hylemorphism. Basically, Lowe thinks that matter is not needed to explain the 
generation of a new substance. Using a hydrogen molecule as an example, Marmodoro 
says: 
On Lowe’s way of thinking about the given example, the proton and the electron 
are there before and after the creation of the hydrogen atom: there is not a need 
for a material continuant that takes on a new form when a new substance is 
created, because nothing takes on a new form in this example, even if a new form 
is created of the composite.82  
 
Marmodoro notes that this reconditioning runs amuck when one considers the difference 
between the isolated atoms and the atoms when combined in the molecule—is this just a 
primitive difference? If any two substances survive as they were before when combined 
into a new substance, what unifies the new substance? Lowe tries to get rid of matter but 
Marmodoro exposes the critical role matter plays in the composite: form must enform 
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something. Furthermore, in cases of change, it seems necessary to postulate a material 
continuant, prime matter or secondary matter (the subject/substance).  
 The final reconditioning attempt that Marmodoro addresses is Michael Rea’s. 
Rea’s paper in question, “Hylomorphism Reconditioned”, argues that we ought to 
reformulate hylemorphism from the standpoint of dispositional monism. For Rea, 
location and power give us the best way to characterize the needs of the hylemorphist. 
Marmodoro notes that Rea’s notion of powers is problematic, as he thinks of them as 
neither universal nor particular. Aristotle himself introduced universals to explain the 
similarities found in nature—where does Rea’s position leave one with regards to 
resemblance and similarity? Furthermore, Marmodoro thinks that Rea recommits 
himself to an “ontology of power universals, which are particularized upon being 
instantiated by spacetime regions”.83 In the end, Marmodoro thinks that Rea’s 
reconditioning attempt is difficult to follow and it likely comes closer to traditional 
Aristotle than expected.  
 Having looked at three reconditioning attempts in the contemporary literature, 
Marmodoro then explains why Aristotle was not a mereological hylemorphist. She says: 
It is a fundamental conclusion of Aristotle’s metaphysics that matter and form 
are not parts of a substance, because if they were, the substance in questions 
would not be unified…[the] intuition of the Homonymy Principle expresses that 
substantial unity is not the result of addition or attachment of parts. If it were so, 
the parts of a whole would exist when severed from the whole. But the parts 
cease to be when severed.84 
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When we think of the human body, we can talk about a human arm, leg, and finger as 
being just that: an arm, a leg, and a finger. But we only know them as such when these 
parts are attached to the human body as a whole. A severed leg has lost its identity and 
functionality. A leg has a specific function given the unifying substantial form of the 
human person. Marmodoro argues that Aristotle is quite clear about this, and therefore 
any attacks on mereological hylemorphism are not actually a threat the traditional 
hylemorphism. She finishes with a suggestion as to what is meant by the substantial 
form “unifying” the elements of a substance. She says:  
Since what is needed is the shedding of only the distinctness of the elements, the 
role of this unifying principle must be just that: to strip the elements of their 
distinctness. I conclude, therefore, that the substantial form according to Aristotle 
is an operation on the elements of a substance, stripping them of their 
distinctness, rather than being an item in the ontology.85 
 
This is a very interesting idea. Instead of thinking about substantial form as an 
ontological item, it is more accurate to think of it as an operation on the elements of a 
substance. My concern would be that the substantial form does more than just 
“repurpose” the material elements of a substance, it also directs the composite to certain 
ends—perhaps the stripping and repurposing inevitably directs the composite. 
Regardless of the implications of this new hylemorphic operation, Marmodoro ably 
defends Aristotle’s hylemorphism, showing that the appeal to this theory is very much 
alive and well. 
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 David Oderberg’s insightful book, Real Essentialism, defends the a traditional A-
T metaphysics, of which substantial change is a major part. Following Aquinas, 
Oderberg frames much of his discussion about hylemorphism with substantial change. 
Oderberg argues that there are three alternative ways of explaining substantial change—I 
will follow his argument to help set-up the next chapter in which I will defend 
hylemorphism against nuclear bundle theory and bare particularism. 
 The first way to explain substantial change is to “do away with talk of supports 
altogether”.86 Oderberg uses the example of a wall: the substantial change is hammering 
the wall into rubble and the accidental change is painting the wall from red to green. So 
the question becomes, what changes in each instance of change? If you say “the wall” 
then it is unclear what is meant by “change,”, since it is clear that the two types of 
change are different. In the case of substantial change, a wall ceases to be; in the case of 
accidental change, the wall changes but remains standing. Oderberg notes that if one gets 
caught up in “naming” the difference between the two types of change, the main 
problem still remains: when a wall ceases to be, a pile of rubble does not simply “pop” 
into existence since creation and annihilation are impossible given the understanding of 
energy in modern physics. 
 Since the first way of understanding substantial change failed, Oderberg then 
turns to an obvious alternative explanation: when the wall is hammered down, it is the 
matter of the wall that is the rubble and therefore the matter survives the substantial 
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change. While intuitive at first, this explanation runs into trouble when different kinds of 
change occur. Oderberg objects: 
The reason is that the support used to explain substantial change cannot be 
something whose existence during the change is not guaranteed. When the wall is 
hammered into rubble some matter survives in the rubble but other matter is 
dispersed to the winds. The matter of the wall undergoes all sorts of atomic and 
molecular changes as a result of the hammering: if the wall is pulverized, are we 
to say that the heap of fine powder before us is the same matter as that of the 
wall?87 
 
One may object and say that all change is survived by matter—particles of some kind 
perhaps—and therefore that matter can explain substantial change. Oderberg thinks that 
the current physics indicates that even quarks can substantially change, so we run into a 
similar problem of there being no guarantee that we have “changeless quarks” 
throughout the transformation. 
To hammer the point home, Oderberg uses a water molecule to highlight a 
critical part of hylemorphism. A water molecule is composed of two hydrogen atoms 
and one oxygen atom. But if the train of thought above is right, then the water molecule 
actually contains both hydrogen and oxygen, since matter survives substantial change. If 
this is true, then we could expect a water molecule to have all the properties of its two 
parts, hydrogen and oxygen. But water does not; in fact, water has very different 
properties from either atom. This is precisely the point Oderberg wants to make. When 
oxygen and hydrogen combine and form a water molecule, they must undergo a 
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transformation in which they lose their distinctness, meaning that they lose their 
characteristic properties. The hylemorphist can explain this by saying that the substantial 
form of the water molecule actualizes the prime matter of the substance and the 
hydrogen and oxygen are only virtually present in the new substance. For these reasons, 
substantial change cannot be understood as being survived by secondary matter (also 
called proximate matter). Oderberg argues that the third and final way to explain the 
phenomenon of substantial change is to adopt hylemorphism, in which prime matter is 
the subject of substantial change.  
Finally, I would like to look briefly at the work of Edward Feser, who has 
ardently defended the work of A-T through various written works and speaking 
engagements. In his book, Scholastic Metaphysics, Feser emphasizes the role of 
substantial form and the “marks” of a natural substance. He says: 
The basic idea is that a natural object is one whose characteristic behavior—the 
ways in which it manifests either stability or changes of various sorts—derives 
from something intrinsic to it…now the difference between that which has such 
an intrinsic principle of operation and that which does not is essentially the 
difference between something having a substantial form and something having a 
merely accidental form.88 
 
Intrinsic finality, as scholastics refer to it, is the idea that natural substances are directed 
towards certain ends, or certain ranges of ends. A natural substance is a mixture of 
substantial form and prime matter, essence and accidents, actuality and potency; yet, the 
substance is unified. Substantial form is the mark of a natural substance precisely 
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because the substance is internally unified and directly towards its own characteristic 
end. This is the principle of intrinsic finality.  
 Feser also defends the crucial distinction between essence and accident. The term 
“property” is tossed about quite often in contemporary metaphysics, but an A-T theorist 
must carefully qualify what is meant by “property”. As discussed in length above, a 
substance has an essence which in turn reflects the specific distinction at the genus level. 
Thus, the essence of a human being is rational animal. But what does this mean? Feser 
contends that: 
A property is just one kind of accident, [and] an essence isn’t in the first place a 
collection even of properties or proper accidents, an accident can be a property 
even if it doesn’t always manifest itself, and appeal to possible worlds to 
determine a thing’s essence gets things backwards.89 
 
From this, we know that properties flow from the essence/nature, or they are proper to 
the essence. For Aquinas, a property is just a proper accident of a substance. This allows 
him to account for defective instances of a kind. For example, think of a mentally 
challenged human being; this person may or may not have the power to exercise reason, 
think abstract thoughts, and the like. For Aquinas and Aristotle, “this doesn’t entail that 
these aren’t really properties after all, but rather that the manifestation of a thing’s 
properties can be frustrated”.90 Being able to distinguish between a “normal” and 
defective instance of a kind is of great value, and I think that Feser makes a strong case 
for one to opt for hylemorphism and the metaphysics of A-T. 
                                                 
89 Ibid., 192.  
 
90 Ibid.  
55 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter I have explicated the traditional hylemorphism of Aristotle and 
Aquinas. First, I examined the theory from the words of Saint Thomas himself, primarily 
utilizing his Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics and De Principiis Naturae. In the 
next chapter, I will use examples of change to argue that hylemorphism is preferable to 
contemporary accounts of substance because it is able to explain both substantial and 
accidental change and it can account for the teleological nature of substance. 
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CHAPTER IV 
A DEFENSE OF HYLEMORPHISM 
 
 In the previous two chapters, I have laid out the bare particularist, nuclear bundle 
theorist, and hylemorphist views. Now, I will argue that hylemorphism is preferable to 
both bare particularism and bundle theory. To do this, I will provide two cases of 
change—one accidental, the other substantial. I will refer back to these examples 
throughout my argument.  
 For a paradigm case of accidental change, think of a man who goes to the beach 
and soaks up the sun for an afternoon. Before this trip to the beach, he is pale; after the 
trip, he is tan. He remains the same person, yet he does change. For a paradigm case of 
substantial change, think of an acorn becoming an oak tree. The acorn does indeed 
become the oak tree. With proper nutrients and sunlight, the acorn ceases to be an acorn 
and it, or rather the something that remains, becomes a tiny oak tree that will grow into a 
mighty tree with time.  
 I will assume the intuitive notion that nothing comes from nothing. It is important 
to be clear on this because it will require one to locate that which remains or endures 
during any change. In fact, it is from this notion and in conjunction with instances of 
change where a substance, or subject, comes to be or ceases to be that we arrive at the A-
T understanding of prime matter. Prime matter is made known to us in the context of 
change—it is that which endures substantial change.  
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HYLEMORPHISM VS. BUNDLE THEORY 
 
 As you recall, Peter Simon’s Nuclear Theory and Markku Keinanen’s Strong 
Nuclear Theory are, arguably, the most sophisticated bundle theories on the market 
today. But how do these contemporary accounts of substance measure up against 
hylemorphism in terms of change? Much of the literature on substance today does not 
focus on change and how we are to explain it. I think that the phenomenon of change 
itself provoked the ancient Greeks to delve into the metaphysical structure of substance. 
For this reason, I think it necessary to ground a comparison of the theories in examples 
of change. 
 In our case of accidental change, Simon’s nuclear theory has a ready explanation 
in hand. Since the man, let’s call him Tom, is actually a bundle of tropes, the first 
question becomes, ‘How is Tom a unified entity?’ Nuclear theory says something like 
this: Tom, being a human being, has a certain nucleus of tropes that acts as an essence of 
sorts. This nuclear bundle serves as the substratum for the outer, contingent tropes that 
Tom has. “Pale-ness” would be one such contingent trope, as would “tan-ness”. So in 
this example of change, “Tom”, or more accurately, Tom’s outer bundle, loses one trope 
but gains another. But this is okay for Tom, since the “tan-ness” trope and “pale-ness” 
trope are in the same family of tropes. SNT has a similar understanding of accidental 
change: the n-bundle forms the nucleus of a substance and serves as the substratum for 
the accidental bundles of tropes, which are themselves “bundled” together with the 
nucleus to form the c-bundle. Simons thinks that “the nucleus is thus itself a tight bundle 
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that serves as the substratum to the looser bundle of accidental tropes, and accounts for 
their all being together”.91  
The reason that NT and SNT are distinct from other formulations of bundle 
theory is that they postulate a nucleus in the substance. The rationale behind the nucleus 
is simple: (1) we need a way to distinguish between essential and accidental properties, 
and (2) we need a substratum to support the non-essential properties of a substance. 
However, while NT and SNT give us a substratum to support the accidental properties of 
a substance and likewise to serve as the support through accidental change, neither NT 
or SNT can give a similar account in the case of substantial change. 
In the case of substantial change, bundle theory runs into serious problems. 
Recall that we are firmly committed to the notion that nothing comes from nothing, 
therefore in cases of substantial change where a substance ceases to exist and a new one 
comes to exist something must survive/endure the change. Simons is clear that the 
nuclear bundle of tropes—his foundational system—serves as the substratum for the 
outer bundle of accidental tropes. Simons acknowledges that “if we had a separate 
substrate substance for the nucleus instead of accepting a bundle theory, we would arrive 
at a theory rather like that of Aristotle or Thomas”.92 NT does away with an ultimate 
substratum for sake of simplicity, but because of this trade-off, nuclear bundle theory 
cannot account for substantial change. The same applies for SNT. 
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 Take our example of substantial change, the acorn becomes the oak tree. An 
acorn has properties that an oak tree does not—yet it is impossible to deny that one does 
not become the other. How can bundle theory account for this radical notion of change in 
which we have substance cessation and substance introduction? The acorn and oak tree 
have unique sets of essential properties that form the essence of each respective 
substance for bundle theory, and if the only substratum available to nuclear theory is the 
nuclear bundle, then it seems that when the acorn becomes an oak tree nothing survives 
this change. If the nuclear bundle contains tropes that are mutually dependent on all 
members of the collection, then any substantial change would destroy the “unity” of the 
nuclear bundle and therefore would destroy the substance. The nuclear bundle theorist 
might counter that some of the tropes survive the change to form the new nuclear bundle 
of the new substance—but this suggests that the tropes are independent, not the 
substance. Furthermore, since both NT and SNT are clear that the nucleus forms a tight 
bundle in which all members are rigidly dependent on one another, this option does not 
seem to be available to the nuclear bundle theorist—it would undermine their motivation 
to postulate a nucleus in the first place. If the tropes in the nuclear bundle were not as 
tightly bound so that a substance could survive losing a nuclear trope, then it would be a 
misrepresentation to call the nucleus the essence of a substance if part of the essence is, 
in fact, non-essential. 
To recap: both Simons’ NT and Keinanen’s SNT reject an ultimate substratum in 
substance so neither theory can account for substantial change without admitting that 
either: (a) certain tropes survive substantial change, or (b) that something does in fact 
60 
 
come from nothing. Now, admitting (a) would violate rigid dependence and the 
foundational system of SNT and NT, respectively, as the nuclear tropes could, in fact, 
exist apart from their nuclear bundle. Admitting (b) would be conceptually difficult: if 
nothing survives instances of substantial change, then every case of substantial change 
would require substances to simply pop into existence without any substratum 
underlying the change. 
Nuclear bundle theory’s inability to account for substantial change was 
anticipated by Arda Denkel in his paper, “On the Compresence of Tropes”.93 He says 
that: 
[There] are situations in which the so-called kernel of the object changes without 
the peripheral layer of contingent properties being lost, and it is hard to 
understand how Simon’s theory, which endows essences with the function of a 
substratum, will permit such a thing.94  
 
He concludes that the internal, foundational relations that bind the nuclear tropes 
together in NT cannot exist as they do since, in our experience, substantial change does 
not result in annihilation of the object. Instead, Denkel opts for a weaker, internal 
relation to bind the nuclear tropes in order to allow a support for accidental tropes in the 
case of substantial change. He calls this relation saturation. On his view, “if B is a 
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saturant of A, A cannot exist in space and time unless it shares its position with B, or 
with any one of B’s “substitutes”.”95  
While this is an interesting take on nuclear bundle theory, I do not think that 
Denkel is successful in accounting for substantial change in nuclear bundle theory. First, 
he is inconsistent in his use of “change”. When he critiques Simon’s NT, he is clear on a 
distinction between alteration (i.e., accidental change) and substantial change. However, 
for the remainder of the paper, he is not clear on what type of change his reformulation 
of nuclear bundle theory can account for. At one point, he says that “one can envisage a 
somewhat weaker link that would allow ordinary change, i.e., the replacement of tropes 
without total disintegration”.96 Is “ordinary” change substantial or accidental—both are 
“ordinary” in the sense that they occur all the time. His qualification of ordinary change 
is not helpful, as accidental change can be thought of like that, and even substantial 
change might be thought of like that in a bundle theory, assuming that the nucleus was 
not a foundational system or some other rigid, interdependent system. Furthermore, in 
the case of organism ceasing to be alive, while the organic material is very much the 
same before and after the substantial change, the organism surely has lots of properties 
that are essential to it qua a living organism. How would Denkel explain this? It seems 
that the only way a nucleus can change and yet remain a support for its accidental tropes 
is by substituting determinate tropes for other determinate tropes under the same 
determinable. What about properties that exist solely in higher organisms? Take a human 
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being’s capacity for humor: when a human being dies, the capacity for humor is not 
substituted by some other (inevitably) similar property in the lifeless physical body that 
remains —it is just gone. While Denkel does anticipate my objection to nuclear bundle 
theory on the grounds that it cannot account for substantial change, I think that Denkel’s 
solution to revive the theory does not work. By rejecting ultimate substrata, bundle 
theory cannot, in principle, explain the common phenomenon of substantial change. 
Hylemorphism admits of an ultimate substratum, prime matter, precisely because 
of the phenomenon of substantial change. That substantial change occurs is substantially 
supported in our everyday life. For this reason, I find hylemorphism a more attractive 
view of substance than any bundle theory, including NT and SNT. The absence of an 
ultimate substratum makes the prospect of change impossible for the bundle theorist. 
Substances need an ultimate substratum to account for the intuitive idea that there is a 
distinction between properties and their bearers. While this last point suggests that bare 
particularism enjoys an advantage over bundle theory, contemporary substratum theories 
are still inferior to traditional hylemorphism. 
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PRIME MATTER VS. BARE PARTICULARS 
 
 The role of a bare particular is that of an individuator, according to contemporary 
bare particularism. For this to be true, the bare particularist must admit that the bare 
particular of a substance is indeed an individual, since it must individuate. In 
contemporary bare particularism, the bare particular individuates the substance and it 
also serves as the substratum, or “pin-cushion”, for the properties. In contrast, 
hylemorphism posits that the substratum of a substance is matter, and depending on 
which composite we are talking about, we must clarify what type of matter. This added 
level of complexity is necessary to preserve the essential-accidental distinction and it is 
an advantage of hylemorphism over bare particularism. 
 For the bare particularist, the only substratum is the bare particular itself. The 
nature of this bare particular, or how “bare” it actually is, depends on whom you are 
reading. Regardless of the nature of this substratum, hylemorphism enjoys a distinct 
advantage in that both accidental and essential change can occur. Recall that for A-T the 
subject of substantial change is prime matter and the subject of accidental change is 
secondary matter, which is the substance itself. The bare particularist cannot invoke a 
similar framework and therefore runs into problems. Jeffrey Brower lists a conjunction 
of claims that hylemorphism can preserve to support the intuitive appeal of 
hylemorphism.: 
(a) Socrates is a direct object of experience. 
(b) Socrates has as least some of his properties essentially. 
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(c) Socrates possess at least some of his properties accidentally. 
(d) Our modal intuitions are objective. 
(e) Socrates is human, but not composed of anything distinct from 
himself that is human. 
(f) Particulars are always characterized by the properties they possess. 
(g) There is only one human in the place occupied by Socrates. 
(h) There are at least some properties by which Socrates alone is 
characterized. 
(g*) There is only one thing that is white in the place occupied by 
Socrates. 
(h*) There are at least some contingent (accidental) properties by which 
Socrates alone is characterized.97 
 
 
Brower’s argument that hylemorphism is preferable to bare particularism stems 
from three major differences between the two theories. First, the substratum in question 
is different. For bare particularism, the bare particular individuates and is charactered in 
a “thin” or “thick” sense. For hylemorphism, the ultimate substratum of substance is 
prime matter, which is formless and non-individual, and the substratum for accidental 
change is the substance, or secondary matter.  
Second, the metaphysics of property possession is different. Recalling 
Wildman’s paper, “Load Bare-Ing Particulars, the bare particularist must make several 
qualifications about property possession. The substance and the bare particular both 
“have” properties, but the senses of having are distinct. In hylemorphism, the 
terminology is much different: a substance is composed of essence and accidents. A 
“property”, as we use it today, would be classified as an accident of a substance. More 
                                                 
97 Jeffrey Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 2014): 162-4. 
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concisely, an essential property (as it is used today) is a proper accident of a substance, 
meaning that it flows from, or is natural to, the substance. The basic idea is that “flow, as 
used by the Scholastics, captures the idea that the essence of a thing is both the formal 
cause and the origin of its properties”.98 In contrast, an accidental property (as it is used 
today) is a contingent accident for A-T, meaning that essence does not essentially have 
this accident and it is not proper to the essence of the substance.  
The motivation to preserve the terminology of Aristotle and Aquinas is not 
trivial. Edward Feser identifies three reasons to support the essence-accident 
composition of substance, and thereby avoid using “essential property” and “accidental 
property” in favor of proper accident and contingent accident. First, the essence must be 
distinct from its properties in order to have a unified substance. He says that “if an 
essence is a set of properties, then what is it that makes is the case that all and only the 
properties that make us a certain kind of thing’s essence occur together in that kind of 
thing?”99 Appealing to laws of nature doesn’t work since laws of nature are shorthand 
for how thing/s operate given their essence. Second, Feser argues that by distinguishing 
between essence and properties, we are acknowledging the way we come to know 
natural substances. Aristotle and Aquinas would both agree that determining the essence 
of a substance is no easy feat; often, what we think is the essence is merely a property. 
The essence is that from which a thing’s properties flow. The third reason to make this 
distinction, and arguably the most important, is that it allows one to distinguish between 
                                                 
98 Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics, 234.  
 
99 Ibid., 231.  
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“normal” and “defective” instances of a kind. To revisit our example of substantial 
change, an acorn that does not become an oak tree is nonetheless an acorn. To become 
an oak tree, the environment needs to be a certain way, the amount of water and sunlight 
needs to be a certain way, and the acorn itself must be developed in such a way as an 
organism in order to change into an oak tree. Lots of things can go wrong—the acorn 
might be damaged—but the acorn is still essentially an acorn. Its capacities might be 
frustrated or blocked, but because it is the thing that it is, it has the innate, active 
potential to become an oak tree. If the essence of a substance was understood as a list of 
essential properties, then there would be fewer members of a given natural kind and 
there would be many more natural kinds! 
The third major difference between hylemorphism and bare particularism 
according to Brower is their respective metaphysics of sameness. He frames this 
difference with more conjunctions: 
(3) Things sharing the same matter are identical (e.g., if we were selling Athena, 
we wouldn’t charge for both the statue and the lump [of bronze], but only for a 
single object). 
(3a) Things sharing the same matter are numerically the same material object 
(more precisely, if x and y share all the same matter at t, then x is numerically the 
same material object as y at t). 
(3b) Distinct things cannot be numerically the same material object (more 
precisely, if x is numerically the same material object as y at t, then x=y at t).100 
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Brower notes that bare particularists opt for co-location with regards to the problem of 
material constitution.101 He says that co-locationists deny (3) on grounds that (3a) is 
false but hylemorphists reject (3) on grounds that (3b) is false. Therefore, hylemorphists 
opt for the “numerical-sameness solution”102 to the problem of material constitution. 
This amounts to an advantage of hylemorphism over bare particularism with regards to 
the metaphysics of sameness since our common sense intuitions about the world “count” 
objects via their matter.  
 As has been discussed at length throughout this thesis, substantial change is the 
hallmark of hylemorphism. The entire reason to distinguish between substrata is to 
account for the different types of change. Brower notes that “familiar cases of substantial 
change call our attention to a type of intrinsic change whose possibility is rarely, if ever, 
considered in the contemporary literature”.103 Substantial change is a major concern for 
any account of substance because it happens so often and it is radically different from 
accidental change Its ability to explain substantial change gives hylemorphism a clear 
advantage over rival theories of substance. Hylemorphism is complicated and highly 
structured because there are complicated phenomena that need to be accounted for. For 
this reason, we ought not to seek the simplest theory; we need to start with explananda 
and go from there.  
                                                 
101 Ibid., 165-72.  
 
102 Ibid., 169.  
 
103 Ibid., 182.  
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 To recap, while bare particularism is able to make the distinction between a 
property and its bearer, it cannot make a distinction between essential and accidental 
properties. It seems the only way a bare particularist could make this distinction would 
be to look to the natures of the properties themselves—some are essential and others are 
accidental. However, a single instance of a property being essential in one substance and 
the same property being accidental in another substance would undermine this approach. 
Perhaps the bare particularist may embrace the consequence that all substances have 
their properties essentially; this is both counterintuitive and too high a price to pay.  
 
TELEOLOGICAL NATURE OF SUBSTANCE 
 
 In my mind, the most attractive feature of hylemorphism is its ability to account 
for the teleological nature of substance. Theories of substance seek to explain our 
experience of substances as being both independent and unified. For A-T, a substance is 
unified by its essence in that all its proper accidents are formally caused by, and 
originating from, the essence. We are not left with a set of essential properties that just 
happen to all be located in this substance. For hylemorphism, the essence explains why a 
substance has the properties that it does. Specifically, the final cause of a substance 
directs a substance to certain characteristic functions/ends. 
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 The idea that substances act for an end, or with a purpose, is explicit in Aquinas. 
He says that “every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing would not follow more 
than another from the action of the agent, unless it were by chance”.104 If a substance, 
acting as an agent (efficient cause), naturally generates an effect, then generating that 
effect must be the final cause of the agent. It is important to note that this does not entail 
that substances necessarily bring about their characteristic effects. As discussed above, 
ends can be frustrated. The final cause of the acorn—to become an oak tree—can be 
frustrated by internal damage or an extrinsic cause (e.g., the acorn is taken by the 
squirrel). We can say that a substance is unified in its actions, operations, and capacities 
through its final cause.  
 This sense of unity that comes from a unified purpose seems to be the best 
explanation of the actions/capacities of natural substances. There may be a number of 
proper accidents that naturally flow from the essence, giving the substance a range of 
powers/capacities. The properties, powers, or capabilities of a substance are themselves 
unified; an essence is not a collection of random properties. Man is a rational animal, 
making “rational animal” the essence of a human being. Having a heart, legs, and tissue 
follows from our animality, just as a sense of humor and our capacity for abstract thought 
follows from our rationality. The properties and capacities we have, qua human beings, 
are unified by our essence, which in turn is ultimately reflective of our final cause. The 
acorn’s internal ability to take in nutrients and to grow is a specific way are tied together 
for the purpose of becoming an oak tree. Many organisms take in nutrients and they all 
                                                 
104 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (Lander, WY: The Aquinas Institute, 2012): I.44.4  
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grow in various ways; acorns do so specifically for a reason. All natural substances are 
internally directed towards certain ends, and it is for this reason that final causality must 
be admitted in our explanation of substance. 
 Final causality, in itself, does not have a contemporary counterpart in the 
metaphysics of substance. The idea of a final cause comes from Aristotle and he 
identified four causes that serve as the “principal modes of explanation of any entity that 
we discover in our experience”.105 The four causes are: (1) material, (2) formal, (3) 
efficient, and (4) final. The material and formal causes are intrinsic to a substance while 
the efficient and final causes are extrinsic given that they terminate in the effect. The 
material cause is that in a thing out of which it is made. The formal cause is that in a 
thing which makes it to be such a thing (i.e., such a kind of thing). The efficient cause is 
that which, by its actions, makes something to be. The final cause is that for the sake of 
which something is made or done.  
As an approach to investigate material substance, the four causes are quite 
foreign to the modern reader since the Aristotelian approach in science was basically 
abandoned during the dawn of Empiricism. However, if our contemporary approach to 
material substance cannot admit of final causes, then perhaps we ought to revisit the 
Aristotelian approach to nature. An argument for the existence of final causality might 
look like this: 
(1) Every agent acts for some end. 
a. Substances that lack agency also “act” for some end as they bring 
about effects. 
                                                 
105 Norris Clarke, The One and the Many (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2001): 209.  
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(2) When an agent can act for a range of ends, there is no reason that the agent 
should pick one end over another. 
a. In substances that lack agency, while the substance does not have the 
ability to “pick” one end over anther, it is possible that any number of 
ends could be sought—and there is no reason one end ought to be 
preferable to another. 
(3) However, some determination must be made and some end must be sought. 
a. In substances that lack agency, some end must be sought as action 
must be taken. 
(4) In our experience, substances have characteristic functions and bring about 
characteristic ends. 
(5) As efficient causality refers to the capacity to bring about some effect, so 
final causality refers to the determination that is made to bring about certain 
effects instead of others 
a. In substances that lack agency, this determination to bring about 
certain effects is built into their very nature.  
(6) The internal directedness of a substance to its characteristic ends is an 
expression of its essence/nature in the context of efficient causality. 
a. In other words, since the essence makes a substance to be a certain 
kind of thing, the characteristic effects that a substance brings about 
originate from its essence.  
 
From this argument it is apparent that final causes, or intrinsic finality, as it is sometimes 
called, is not a thing additional to an essence. Rather, the finality/directedness of a 
substance is just an expression of the essence in the context of [a substance bringing 
about an effect].  
 As this terminology is foreign to us, one might wish to account for final causes in 
terms we are familiar with. However, I do not think that bundle theory or bare 
particularism can account for intrinsic finality because it necessitates an essence that is 
distinct from any properties. NT and SNT account for essence by pointing to the nuclear 
bundle of tropes in a substance. Bare particularism does not seem to be able to make any 
distinction between different kinds of properties so it cannot give us essential properties. 
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For these reasons, final causality is unique to hylemorphism and the A-T metaphysics of 
substance. 
 In conclusion, hylemorphism is more attractive than bundle theory and bare 
particularism for several reasons. First, hylemorphism allows for a distinction between 
essence and accidents. Second, hylemorphism can account for the phenomenon of 
substantial change. And third, hylemorphism can explain the natural tendencies and 
characteristic activities of substances via final causality. However, the theoretical 
differences that support the advantages of hylemorphism over contemporary accounts of 
substance also have price tags—making this theory untenable for some. 
 
Concerns for a (Potential) Hylemorphist 
 
At this point, one might opt for hylemorphism without considering the theoretical 
price tag. In chapter 7 of his book, Brower identifies several possible concerns for 
hylemorphism, but I want to focus on two. First, is the nature of prime matter. Second, 
the commitment to the existence of God. 
 Prime matter is inherently strange. It is non-individual “stuff” that is not a 
member of any kind, nor does prime matter have any nature. Prime matter is truly a 
unique kind of thing, since it is not really a thing at all! Many people might pass over 
hylemorphism simply because prime matter is too mysterious. But recall that Aquinas 
and Aristotle come to postulate prime matter only when considering the phenomenon of 
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substantial change. Prime matter is not knowable in any other way. In this sense, it is 
unavoidable for A-T. Denying substantial change is a dubious prospect and therefore the 
theoretical price tag associated with mysterious prime matter may not be of consequence 
for the hylemorphist. The notion of a bare particular is hardly less mysterious—arguably 
a bare particular is more mysterious since it satisfies the role of individuator. People 
interested in the metaphysics of substance are already invested in many “high-priced” 
theoretical items. 
Concerning the commitment to the existence of God, if you recall the diagram of 
substance on page 37 (figure 1), A-T do not restrict their metaphysics of substance to 
material substance. Their metaphysics of substance comes from a consideration of being 
qua being. The fundamental distinction is between substance-accident: (1) substance is 
that which exists independently (subsistence), and (2) accidents inhere in substance and 
cannot exist independently. For A-T, either something exists in itself or it exists in 
another. Given that substance is that which subsists independently, A-T then distinguish 
between a simple substance and a composite substance. God is the only simple substance 
since there is nothing non-essential in God; God has no accidents. All other substances 
are compositions of [substance + accidents]. Hylemorphism is a part of substance 
metaphysics for A-T as it explains how [prime matter + substantial form] come together 
to compose material substance. Furthermore, in material substances that lack agency 
(e.g., plants and (at least some) animals), God is necessary to explain the internal 
directedness in those substances. The following argument can be added to my argument 
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for final causality from above (page 71) in order to show the relation between intrinsic 
finality and God: 
(7) As final causality is understood as that which directs the agent to such and 
such an end, so final causality requires a mind to determine, or guide, the 
efficient cause. 
(8) Since some substances lack agency, their directedness towards certain ends is 
predetermined in their essence/nature by God. 
(9) Therefore, the existence of God is required to explain the 
directedness/finality that is found in substances that lack agency. 
 
 
 Formally, God is the distal cause and the plant/animal is the proximate cause in the case 
of [a substance bringing about its characteristic effect/s]. While Aquinas has five distinct 
ways to prove the existence of God (Summa Theologiae I), I think that these 
considerations necessitate the existence of God for the hylemorphist. This may deter 
some from this theory of substance, but I think arguments for the existence of God are 
far more convincing that arguments for one theory of substance over another.  
 In this thesis, I have argued that hylemorphism and the metaphysics of substance 
formulated by A-T is a more attractive view than bundle theory and bare particularism. 
Now, when one enters into an historical conversation in metaphysics, it can be difficult 
to find something novel to say. While I have certainly cited some arguments from 
Brower, Feser, Oderberg, and others, I think that I have been able to contribute to the 
metaphysics of substance literature—if only in a small way. I hope to shift the approach 
of this debate to the teleological nature of substance. More must be written on the 
teleological nature of substance in order to establish a convincing need for an essence 
distinct from properties. Once this need has been established, we can refocus our energy 
on understanding how A-T metaphysics might be suited to explain the findings of 
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contemporary science. Furthermore, instead of trying to reformulate the metaphysics of 
A-T into contemporary terminology, we ought to readopt the traditional terminology 
with the hope that, in short period of time, it will be familiar to metaphysicians. Much of 
literature defending traditional hylemorphism aims to understand hylemorphism in terms 
of contemporary accounts of substance—our time would be better spent establishing a 
convincing need for an essence distinct from properties to explain the internal 
directedness of material substances. 
 In conclusion, hylemorphism is a complicated and foreign theory to 
contemporary theorists but it has several attractive features. First, it can make a clear 
distinction between essential and accidental properties. Second, hylemorphism can give 
an account of substantial change. Third, hylemorphism can account for the teleological 
nature of substance. For these reasons, hylemorphism is a more attractive theory of 
substance than any contemporary account. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In this thesis, I have defended traditional hylemorphism over contemporary 
accounts of substance. In the second chapter, I laid out two prominent contemporary 
accounts of substance, nuclear bundle theory and bare particularism. I primarily focused 
on the work of Peter Simons and Markku Keinanen in bundle theory and J. P Moreland 
and Timothy Pickavance in bare particularism. Nuclear bundle theory has advantages 
over bare particularism with respect to its ability to make the essential – accidental 
distinction among properties. Bare particularism has an advantage over nuclear bundle 
theory with respect to substance unity and the intuitive distinction between properties 
and their bearers. Both accounts fail to explain the phenomenon of substantial change.  
 In the third chapter, I used Aquinas to explicate traditional hylemorphism. The 
theory of hylemorphism holds that a substance is a composite of matter and form. The 
need for a composition comes from an analysis of change. Aquinas, following Aristotle, 
distinguishes between both accidental and substantial change. In accidental change, the 
subject, or substance survives the change. In substantial change, prime matter survives 
the change. More precisely, prime matter is the subject of substantial change and 
secondary matter, or the substance, is the subject of accidental change. While 
hylemorphism originates from the work of Aristotle and Aquinas, there are a number of 
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contemporary defenders. I briefly examine the work of David Oderberg, Edward Feser, 
and Anna Marmodoro.  
 In the fourth chapter, I explained why hylemorphism is preferable to nuclear 
bundle theory and bare particularism. With regards to nuclear bundle theory, 
hylemorphism does a much better job accounting for substance unity by postulating an 
essence distinct from its accidents. Furthermore, without an ultimate substratum for 
substance, bundle theory cannot account for substantial change. Concerning bare 
particularism, the inability to make the essential-accidental distinction makes 
hylemorphism the more attractive theory. Also, hylemorphism has a distinct advantage 
over both contemporary accounts concerning the teleological nature of substance. 
 While there are theoretical price tags associated with prime matter and other 
tenets of hylemorphism, the explanatory power of this theory makes hylemorphism the 
most attractive theory of substance. The phenomenon of substantial change must be 
explained; no other contemporary account can rival the metaphysics of change upon 
which hylemorphism is built.  
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